Locke's Bible

1,400 words

In my last essay, I wrote about the philosophical base of the Social Contract Theory, that life in the state of nature was brutish and short, and that by reason mankind consented and consents to the compact that legitimizes government and stabilizes society. This time, I will write about how this theory is largely derived from Tanakh, The Hebrew Bible. On that point, I want to add a caveat. G-d forbid I ever say with certainty “This is what the Bible says” on a matter the Bible does not discuss. I am not convinced, for instance, that G-d particularly cares about tax rates outside of Israel, nor did the Christ object to Caesar’s tax policy. Yet it is unfeasible to discuss a subject so reliant on fundamental values such as the Social Covenant without discussing the origin of those fundamental values in the West. It was unavoidable to the Enlightenment philosophers, especially John Locke, and as for myself, I believe it is a topic I can approach without being audacious with the word of the Almighty.

Most Social Contract theorists-- bar Rousseau-- agreed that life in the state of nature was “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short,” and that natural rights predated the social contract but had, in such a state, little protection. We see this very early on in the Genesis narrative with the story of Qayin and Havel (Or Cain and Abel). With no government save G-d himself in sight, Qayin and Havel possessed the three fundamental, natural rights listed by John Locke: Life, liberty, property. Qayin grew envious, in part, of Havel’s property and then deprived him of life. Thus we have the depravity of mankind in the state of nature, and we see also that Havel had no societal means of defending his natural rights when mankind was in such a deprived state. This first sin against fellow man set precedence for Qayin’s descendants:

“For I have slain a man for wounding me,

And a young man for my hurt.

If Qayin shall be avenged sevenfold,

truly Lemekh seventy and sevenfold.”

(Bereshit/Genesis 4:23-24)

This theme is thus carried over to the story of Noach: “Then Adonai saw that the wickedness of man was great on the earth, and that all impulse of the thoughts of his heart was only evil continually” (Bereshit 6:5). From that conclusion, it is known that HaShem wiped the chaos from the face of the earth and thereby restored order to begin anew. And after the Flood, of course, G-d created a Covenant with the descendants of Noach—and a covenant, it might be said, is quite similar to a social compact, except that it leaves more room for potential error and forgiveness. Interestingly, the word used here, בָּרָה (Bereet), can be applied not only to a covenant between man and G-d but also in an alliance, marriage, or friendship.

Now, in Jewish oral tradition, as recorded in the Talmud, there are seven Noahide Laws that are applicable to all mankind, as opposed to the 613 Mosaic commandments applicable exclusively to the descendants of Ya’akob (Jacob). Most of these seven are contain the typical, self-evident moral rules: Don’t murder, don’t steal, don’t commit adultery etc. Interestingly, however, the seventh Noahide Law was more applicable to society as a whole than to an individual: Establish courts of justice. Note that it was affirmed by the Council of Jerusalem that Christian gentiles are bound by these laws but are not by Mosaic Law.

Not only must all nations have courts of justice, those courts must rule on basic and universal principles; In other words, natural law. Even the pagans such as Plato and Cicero knew this natural law though they knew little if anything about the Torah, because it is fundamentally reasonable. In the words of Cicero, “For there is but one essential justice which cements society, and one law which establishes this justice. This law is right reason, which is the true rule of all commandments and prohibitions. Whoever neglects this law, whether written or unwritten, is necessarily unjust and wicked.” Cicero believed this natural law was universal, applying to Rome the same as to Athens and elsewhere, and the same today as to yesterday and thereafter.

To return from Noahide to Mosaic law, from the point of Sinai onwards, a surface level reading of most of Torah serves a singular purpose. That purpose is to establish the customs and law of the land of Israel. We find within it laws against animal cruelty, usury, adultery, murder, theft, and so on. There are laws regarding tithes and taxation, promoting charity, and establishing authority. Indeed, since the destruction of the Temple and the beginning of Israel’s exile from their homeland roughly 2,000 years ago, Jews have been unable to fulfill more or less half of the 613 commandments because they were written for that particular land and government, but that is beside the point.

The reason I reference Jewish Law in an essay on the social covenant is this: If it is accepted that Jewish Law is a covenant and further that at least the basis of Jewish Law is inspired originally by HaShem, it must be concluded that HaShem inspired the social covenant. Thus as HaShem established a covenant between Himself and Man and between Himself and Israel, he established also a covenant between Man and Man, and especially between Jew and Jew. It is by that notion that Jewish philosophy established a balance between individualism and community. Man is individually responsible to G-d, and because man is individually responsible to a G-d who ordained a covenant between men, man is also individually responsible to fellow man.

Mind! This Covenant is not a reflection of the social Compact Theory. On the contrary, the Social Compact Theory is a reflection of the Covenant. John Locke, the most accepted proponent of the Theory, referenced Tanakh hundreds of times in his treatises. He dismantled the Divine Right Theory by pointing out that it was David who succeeded King Shaul, not Shaul’s sons. He supported Natural Law by positing that Qayin (And indeed the reader) knew that murder was immoral long before the Torah explicitely prohibited it. He posited that an inherent equality among men is derived from being in the likeness of “One omnipotent and infinitely wise Maker.” He even supported popular rule by the notion that the judge Yiftach (Jephthah) was made captain by the people (Shofetim/Judges 11:11). Thomas Hobbes referenced Tanakh less often, but even his famous book title Leviathan is a nod to the scriptural beast.

One of the common issues that such Enlightenment philosophers encountered was that, by removing religion’s overt influence from secular society, they deprived the social compact of its source and legitimacy. Nietzsche famously wrote:

“G-d is dead. G-d remains dead. And we have killed him. How shall we comfort ourselves, the murderers of all murderers? What was holiest and mightiest of all that the world has yet owned has bled to death under our knives: who will wipe this blood off us? What water is there for us to clean ourselves? What festivals of atonement, what sacred games shall we have to invent? Is not the greatness of this deed too great for us? Must we ourselves not become gods simply to appear worthy of it?”

Of course G-d is not dead; those who believe in G-d will not buy it for a second, and Nietzsche himself did not believe in G-d to begin with. Nonetheless, he did know that the social covenant as understood by the West could not exist without the legitimacy lended to it by religion-- and if the Abrahamic, monotheistic religion was to be overthrown from Western societies, then a faux, secular religion would inevitably take its place. Perhaps the most glaring examples would be the repurposing of Notre Dame Cathedral by the Cult of Reason in the midst of the French Revolutions or of the replacement of religion with ideology-- communism, fascism, socialism, and nationalism to name the most disastrous. When the German Nazis burned the Tanakh, they claimed only to be getting rid of Judaism, but without Tanakh, there is no Christianity either. And without Christianity, there is no Western morality and thus no Western social covenant.

Volumes have been written on the subject, but this essay needs to end somewhere sooner. So I will leave you with stressing this foremost point: The Social Covenant was not an invention of the Enlightenment thinkers. Rather, it was preserved by the Enlightenment thinkers as a vital part of society, endangered by tumtulous times, and derived in the Judaic belief that all mankind is equal before G-d and created (intellectually and spiritually) in His image.

Sources:

Cicero. Treatise on the Laws.

Locke, John. “SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT by JOHN LOCKE.” The Project - Gutenberg EBook of Second Treatise Of Government By John Locke., www.gutenberg.org/files/7370/7370-h/7370-h.htm.

Nietzsche, Friedrich. Thus Spake Zarathustra.

“Sanhedrin” (via Sefaria), a tractate of the Talmud

Strong’s Exhaustive Concordance of the Bible. 1984.

“The Council of Jerusalem.” Papal Basilica - Saint Paul Outside-the-Walls, https://www.vatican.va/various/basiliche/san_paolo/en/san_paolo/concilio.htm.

The Koren Tanakh